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Abstract  
Progress in Big Data in recent years has grown exponentially, which has 
allowed the detection and processing of a large amount of data. Until recently, 
this fact was unattainable by the lack of mechanization of the corporate 
governance reports. This paper investigates the relationship between 
corporate governance decisions affect the indebtedness policies of 1,956 
industrial companies listed in Europe and the USA over the period 2016–2018 
(5,868 observations). To measure corporate governance decisions, we use 
detailed information on the expertise of audit committees, the proportion of 
independent directors, board structures and women's presence on corporate 
boards. Our findings, which are based on a static panel data analysis, show 
that there is a strong negative relationship between Audit Committees 
expertise and indebtedness level in European and North American companies. 
There are also evidence that European and American companies with a one-
tier board structure and Audit Committees expertise are less likely to have 
lower level of indebtedness. Our results shed new light on corporate 
governance in relation to the experience of audit committees and the influence 
of their characteristics on indebtedness policy.  
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1. Introduction  
One of the consequences of the Internet and global interconnection through the network is 
the enormous volume of information that organizations and the general public have access 
to. In recent decades, the challenges and opportunities of Big Data management is a relevant 
issue in business management in general, and in particular, in financial management. 
Therefore, it can be analysed the impact of obtaining, managing and analyzing data in the 
different areas of the company: strategic definition and its implementation, corporate decision 
making, design of financial policies, etc. 
Big Data provides a new vision, a future perspective in order to predict what can happen to 
take advantage of opportunities and thus, anticipate the events with the use of the techniques 
provided by the “Business Analytics” area. In this way, you can define analytical models that 
allow you to model the functioning of organizations. Consequently, it highlights the need for 
a new paradigm of storage, processing and enhancement of Big Data. Organizations which 
are move in this philosophy and are generators of information become “Data Driven 
Business”, directed towards decision making as well as strategic management. 
In line with above arguments, the objective of this work is to analyze the extent to which 
corporate governance decisions affect the indebtedness policies of industrial companies listed 
in Europe and the USA. Particularly, special attention is paid to the effect produced by the 
previous experience of the Audit Committee in the field of finance on the levels of 
indebtedness of these companies.  
The main findings of this manuscript provide evidence that companies which have a one-tier 
board structure, have lower levels of indebtedness and if they also have Audit Committees 
with experience in finance, this reducing effect is softened. These results are generalizable 
for both Europe and the USA, although this effect is more moderate for North American 
companies. 
2. Theoretical Framework and Hypothesis 
Big Data explains extremely large data sets with large storage capacity that generally need to 
be analyzed using computational methods (Cockcroft and Russell, 2018). In this sense, 
companies and research centers are deploying a very rigorous computing power to make 
sense of the huge amounts of data. A large part of the interest that “big” data is that they have 
a greater potential to contain more interesting patterns and anomalies than “small” data 
(Cockcroft and Russell, 2018). 
Rehman, Chang, Batool and Wah (2016), among others, characterize Big Data for its volume, 
velocity and value. Subsequently, IBM and Microsoft added one more feature, veracity, to 
describe the reliability of the data. However, and according to Bhimani and Willcocks (2014), 
104
Inmaculada Bel, Alfredo Grau 
  
  
this volume of data which is generated in a continuous and increasing way is largely 
unstructured. Many of them are likely to be organized in an economically useful sense and 
quickly processed for decision-making. effective in real time (Krishnan, 2013). 
2.1. Impact of Big Data in Finance  
The use of Big Data in the financial field has developed in recent years very quickly (Ye and 
Li, 2017). Despite these advances, there is still little research on how Big Data has influenced 
the way financial decisions are made, about their impact on strategic responsibilities (Quinn, 
Dibb, Simkin, Canhoto and Analogbei, 2016), or how this data is handled at the board level 
(Nutt and Wilson, 2010). However, Big Data offers the potential to reduce risk and improve 
these strategic decisions by allowing high-level leadership teams to have a more 
comprehensive vision (Filatotchev and Nakajima, 2010). 
Turner, Schroeck and Shockley (2013) consider that Big Data is a source of information and 
one of the most important assets that organizations have. The financial management business 
is packed full of transactions that add growing information to the industry. Hence, Big Data 
offers in finance management the possibility of adopting a more strategic and proactive role 
within the company (Chua, 2013). In particular, Bhimani and Willcocks (2014) warn against 
reorienting financial functions to simply harness the potential of big data. 
2.2. Hypothesis 
In the corporate governance field, Audit Committee (AC) characteristics (such as expertise 
or independence) are considered relevant factors in order to reduce the opportunistic 
behaviour of managers and by mitigating agency problems (Madi, Ishak and Manaf, 2014). 
In this sense, investors demand the presence of audit committees in the companies whose 
members have relevant expertise (Ghafran and O'Sullivan, 2013). Audit committees with 
financial expertise are considered an internal monitoring mechanism that can mitigate agency 
problems and tend to impact on indebtedness policy (Javaid and Javid, 2017). Past research 
has analysed the effect of some aspects of corporate field with the level of debt such as the 
independent directors (Doan and Nguyen, 2018), audit committees expertise (Carcello, 
Hollingsworth, Klein and Neal, 2006), firm size (Harford, Li and Zhao, 2007), Board 
Structure Type (Calza, Profumo and Tutore, 2017), CEO duality (Harris, 2014), board 
structure type (Pucheta-Martínez, Gallego-Álvarez and Bel-Oms, 2019), gender diversity 
(Harris, 2014), among others. The hypotheses to study in Big Data context are: 
Hypothesis 1: The greater the financial experience of the AC, the lower the 
indebtedness. 
Hypothesis 2: The greater the financial experience of the AC, the greater the negative 
relationship between the independence board and the indebtedness. 
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Hypothesis 3: The greater the financial experience of the AC, the lower the negative 
relationship between the board structure type and the indebtedness. 
Hypothesis 4: The greater the financial experience of the AC, the lower the negative 
relationship between the women’s presence on boards and the indebtedness. 
3. Sample and Variables  
The sample used in this study comprised international firm years observations from 
THOMSON REUTERS EIKON database from 2016 to 2018. This sample included the industrial 
sector of all the countries belonging to Europe and USA and is grouped in a static data panel 
with 1,956 industrial companies and 5,868 observations. We have used the industrial sector 
is due to the fact that this sector plays a very significant role in the global economy. 
The series of the variables used (Table 1) have been filtered to eliminate both the observations 
with errors or absent, as well as those extreme observations in the distributions. This double 
filtering process has lead to losing approximately 32.8% for the USA and 64.4% for Europe.  
Table 1. Description of the explanatory variables. 
Parameters Description 
Leverage Variable 
LEV Leverage: Total Debts / Equity 
Main Explanatory Variables 
EXA Expertise Audit Committees: Dummy variable that takes the value if the members of 
the audit committee have financial experience and 0 otherwise. 
INDBO Independence Board: Ratio between the proportion of independent directors on boards 
directors and the total members of the board. 
BOTYPE Board Structure Type: Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the company has a 
one-tier board structure and 0, if the company has a two-tier board structure. 
BGEN Board Gender Diversity: Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the companies 
include female directors on corporate boards and 0 otherwise. 
Control Variables 
CEODU CEO duality: Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the CEO of the firm also serves 
as chairman of the board and 0, otherwise. 
LSIZE Company Size: Logarithm of total assets of firms. 
ROA Profitability: Profit Before Interest and Taxes / Total Assets. 
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In this section, we analyze the determinants of level of indebtedness and will pay special 
interest to the effect produced by the financial experience of the Audit Committee. We group 
the large data into a static panel that will allow us, to some extent, to control the unobservable 
heterogeneity that could occur in the treatment of these data. The econometric approach is: 
 
LEVjt = δ0 + δ1EXAjt + δ2INDBOjt + δ3BOTYPEjt + δ4BGENjt 
                          +(δ5INDBOjt + δ6BOTYPEjt + δ7BGENjt) ∗ EXAjt 
+ δ8CEODUjt +  δ9LSIZEjt + δ10ROAjt + εjt 
(1) 
 
where 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑗𝑡  is the level of indebtedness for industrial sector j in the time period t calculated 
as the quotient between the total liabilities and equity. 𝛿0 represents the regression constant. 
𝛿𝑗 represents the estimated values of all variables. 𝜀𝑗𝑡 are the random perturbations. 
The parameters have been estimated by incorporating instrumental variables through the 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) to the equation in first differences. To measure the 
goodness of fit are proposed: adjusted R2, contrast of Wald set, and estimation error. In 
addition, the second order serial correlation m2 test of Arellano and Bond (1991). 
Furthermore, the over-identification of restrictions Sargan (1958) test. To detect possible 
multicollinearity problems, we apply the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF). The results 
obtained for all companies, we confirm the absence of multicollinearity problems since the 
values of the VIF range between 1.1021 and 7. 7763 (Neter, Wasserman and Kutner, 1989). 
5. Results  
Table 2 shows the findings for checking all the hypotheses proposed. Moreover, we want to 
examine the individual effect of independent variables with the indebtedness policy and the 
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
C -0.173**(-1.971) 0.2912(1.465) 0.537(0.729) 0.594(0.814) 
EXA  -0.417**(-2.047)  -0.072*(-0.122) 
INDBO  0.035(0.206)  1.152*(0.323) 
BOTYPE  -0.108** (-2.727)  -0.068**(-1.366) 
BGEN  -0.058(-0.327)  -0.978(-0.304) 
Cross Effects     
INDBO*EXA 
 
-0.046(-0.246)  -1.093(-0.288) 
BOTYPE*EXA 
 
0.119**(2.418)  0.056*(1.975) 
BGEN*EXA 
 
0.194(0.939)  1.08 (0.331) 
Control Variables 
CEODU -0.036(-0.734) -0.032(-1.162) 0.085*(0.619) 0.015(0.115) 
LSIZE 0.042***(9.136) 0.032***(4.966) 0.004**(0.115) 0.001*(0.016) 
ROA -0.953***(-15.543) -0.934** (5.748) -0.189**(-1.300) -0.185**(-1.296) 
R2 adjusted 0.0424 0.0828 0.1102 0.1641 
Wald 293.99** 9541.85** 2442.76** 12528.60** 
Est. error 1.2241 0.9394 1.0378 0.9666 
m2 Test 0.92 0.74 0.96 0.88 
Sargan Test 62.67(69) 91.66(73) 71.66(69) 76.52(72) 
The data correspond to regression results of GMM model in first differences, described in the equation (1). t-
Statistic in brackets. Chi-squared: degrees of freedom in brackets for Sargan Test. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. 
The results obtained for Europe are the following. Model 1 provide evidence that the firm 
size has a positive (at 1%). However, the profitability presents a negative (at 1%). These 
results confirm the premise that companies with higher size, results in a higher indebtedness 
policy and lower levels of return on assets. In Model 2, the coefficient of EXA variable is 
negative (at 5%). Hence, we confirm the explanatory power of this variable and hence, the, 
compliance with Hypothesis 1. Our evidence suggests that European firms with include this 
committee tend to support a lower level of leverage, in line with Badolato, Donelson and Ege 
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(2014). Moreover, we examine the impact of board structure (BOTYPE) and policy of 
indebtedness. This finding provide evidence that the coefficient is negative (at 5%).  
The BOTYPE*EXA is positive and of opposite sign to the main variable in Europe and the 
USA. This result leads us to accept the Hypothesis 3. As a consequence, European firms with 
a one-level board structure are less likely to have a lower level of indebtedness when there is 
a greater effect of this committee, in line with Pucheta-Martínez et al. (2019).  
According to the results for USA, Model 1 provide evidence that the duality of CEO and firm 
size have a positive (at 10% and 5%, respectively). However, the profitability presents a 
negative sign (at 10%). These results confirm that when the CEO of the firm also serves as 
chairman of the board and when the companies have higher size, results in a higher debt 
policy and lower levels of return on assets.  
In Model 2, the coefficient of EXA is negative (at 5%). This finding leads us to accept the 
Hypothesis 1, which suggests that American firms with include an audit committee with 
directors with financial experience tend to support a lower level of indebtedness. On the other 
hand, the results also findings that the proportion of independent directors on corporate 
boards (INDBO) shows a positive sign (at 10%), contrary to our predictions. According to 
this result, companies which include independent directors tend to increase the indebtedness 
policy. Furthermore, the variable board structure type (BOTYPE) presents a negative sign 
(at 5%). Therefore, all companies) with a one-tier board structure and Audit Committees 
expertise (BOTYPE*EXA) are less likely to have lower level of indebtedness. Furthermore, 
the variable board structure type exhibits a negative sign (at 10%). Therefore, the Hypothesis 
3 has not to be rejected. Our finding suggests that companies located in USA with a one-tier 
board structure are less likely to have lower level of indebtedness when there is higher effect 
of audit committee expertise. 
In respect of cross effects analyzed for the proportion of independent directors on corporate 
boards (INDBO*EXA) and gender diversity (BGEN*EXA), they do not present statistical 
significance. Consequently, we should reject Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 4. 
6. Conclusions  
The aim of this investigation is to study, in the Big Data environment, the extent to which 
corporate governance decisions affect the indebtedness policies of industrial companies listed 
in Europe and the USA. We have paid special attention to the effect produced by the previous 
experience of the Audit Committee in the field of finance on the indebtedness levels. 
The European and North American companies with a one-level board structure are less likely 
to have a lower level of debt when there is a greater effect of the audit committee's experience. 
While it is true that the financial formation of this committee, in itself, allows reducing the 
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volume of debt, when it acts in an organization where the governance structure is unique, this 
effect is less expansionary. This could be explained by the fact that this financial expertise 
leads the audit committees to drive an optimal capital structure that does not necessarily 
imply a simple reduction in indebtedness, but that these levels are the most appropriate for 
industrial companies listed. Moreover, in board structure unitary when all board members 
have the same responsibilities and functions, independent directors may be not fulfill their 
monitory duties. This fact reduces the credibility and objectivity of the board members when 
monitoring managerial team and ultimately, may reduce in lower level the indebtedness 
policy. These findings are observed for firms listed in both markets, although it should be 
noted that this effect has less impact in the USA. 
Several implications can be derived from this analysis. Firstly, the findings of this 
investigation provide evidence that there is a limited presence of female directors on 
corporate boards. In this sense, our manuscript has a relevant value for government and 
regulatory bodies, because it allows them to note that there is under-representation of women 
on boards for Europe and USA, since there is not effect on the leverage with or without 
crossing effect. Policymakers should recommend the representation of female directors on 
boards since they behave as a control mechanism that improves the financial decisions of the 
companies. Second, regulators in Europe and USA should made efforts to consider audit 
committee members with financial expertise as internal control mechanisms in the 
companies. This evidence should lead policymakers to consider the benefits to inclusion of 
financial experts on audit committees to the stakeholder. Third, this evidence may be useful 
for managers who are willing to enhance the indebtedness policy, as we show that companies 
reduce the indebtedness if there is Audit Committees expertise and one-tier board structure. 
Our study’s findings should be considered with caution. The sample used in this study is 
based on European and North American Companies on the industrial sectors, although the 
study revealed some factors that are not found in the past research yet. Further research can 
focus on investigating if the Audit Committee experience has an effect on the making 
decision process of the indebtedness policy in other countries such as Latin-America or Asia.   
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